In this thread, all posts and responses with the name of clickjaw correspond to me. (Any highlighted text in italics is mine)
clickjaw
Are the explanations of physicalism
incoherent, or self-defeating?
If the rational explanations of
physicalism and neuroscience (i.e. mental phenomena as nothing but
neuronal structure) are correct, then an experience regarding the
first-person appearance of the intentionality of our thoughts in
relationship to objects in reality is an illusion.
A person's design of anything subsists on the fact that her thoughts "about" things (i.e. intentional thoughts) be correlative to reality.
Therefore, according to the explanations of physicalism, a person's design of anything is an illusion.
However, rational explanations about anything are designed.
Therefore, rational explanations about anything, according to physicalism, are an illusion.
But, if rational explanations about anything are an illusion, then so are the rational explanations regarding physicalism and all that entails.
Likewise, if the rational explanation of physicalism regarding anything is an illusion, then so is the explanation that "the experience regarding the first-person appearance of the intentionality of our thoughts in relation to objects in reality is an illusion.", is itself, an illusion.
Therefore, the rational explanations of physicalism regarding anything are incoherent at best, or self-defeating at worst.
So my question is: Are the explanations of physicalism incoherent, or self-defeating? Why?
A person's design of anything subsists on the fact that her thoughts "about" things (i.e. intentional thoughts) be correlative to reality.
Therefore, according to the explanations of physicalism, a person's design of anything is an illusion.
However, rational explanations about anything are designed.
Therefore, rational explanations about anything, according to physicalism, are an illusion.
But, if rational explanations about anything are an illusion, then so are the rational explanations regarding physicalism and all that entails.
Likewise, if the rational explanation of physicalism regarding anything is an illusion, then so is the explanation that "the experience regarding the first-person appearance of the intentionality of our thoughts in relation to objects in reality is an illusion.", is itself, an illusion.
Therefore, the rational explanations of physicalism regarding anything are incoherent at best, or self-defeating at worst.
So my question is: Are the explanations of physicalism incoherent, or self-defeating? Why?
