Dialog 1 - "Are the explanations of physicalism incoherent, or self-defeating?"

In this thread, all posts and responses with the name of clickjaw correspond to me. (Any highlighted text in italics is mine)

 

clickjaw

Are the explanations of physicalism incoherent, or self-defeating?

If the rational explanations of physicalism and neuroscience (i.e. mental phenomena as nothing but neuronal structure) are correct, then an experience regarding the first-person appearance of the intentionality of our thoughts in relationship to objects in reality is an illusion.

A person's design of anything subsists on the fact that her thoughts "about" things (i.e. intentional thoughts) be correlative to reality.

Therefore, according to the explanations of physicalism, a person's design of anything is an illusion.

However, rational explanations about anything are designed.

Therefore, rational explanations about anything, according to physicalism, are an illusion.

But, if rational explanations about anything are an illusion, then so are the rational explanations regarding physicalism and all that entails.

Likewise, if the rational explanation of physicalism regarding anything is an illusion, then so is the explanation that "the experience regarding the first-person appearance of the intentionality of our thoughts in relation to objects in reality is an illusion.", is itself, an illusion.

Therefore, the rational explanations of physicalism regarding anything are incoherent at best, or self-defeating at worst.

So my question is: Are the explanations of physicalism incoherent, or self-defeating? Why?

Magritte

Something about this baffles me. What is it about intentionality that would benefit from a non physicalist explanation? I've never seen a satisfactory explanation of this.

Let's grant that you have an immaterial mind (and for the purposes of this argument we'll pretend the interaction problem doesn't exist). Now, please describe precisely what intentionality is in your scenario (what does it mean for something immaterial to "mean something" or "be about something") and why it cannot exist or be expressed through a physical process.

fishpasta

Neither.

It's not at all obvious whether the first statement is true, as there are many physicalisms in which you have intentionality with respect to real objects (take searle's, for instance).

As to the other statements, they hardly make sense to me, and seem rather irrelevant from what little I can gleam of them.

clickjaw

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Originally Posted by Magritte

Something about this baffles me. What is it about intentionality that would benefit from a non physicalist explanation? I've never seen a satisfactory explanation of this.

A physical explanation is no explanation as is described above. The experience of me having intentional thoughts sure seems real to me. The experience that my thoughts about things are correct also seems real. Is it real or correct? According to physicalism, the answer is inconclusive because physicalism can't really get off the ground.

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Let's grant that you have an immaterial mind (and for the purposes of this argument we'll pretend the interaction problem doesn't exist). Now, please describe precisely what intentionality is in your scenario (what does it mean for something immaterial to "mean something" or "be about something")

You've just said it.

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....and why it cannot exist or be expressed through a physical process.

Because it can't.

clickjaw

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Originally Posted by fishpasta

Neither.

It's not at all obvious whether the first statement is true, as there are many physicalisms in which you have intentionality with respect to real objects (take searle's, for instance).

Enlighten me.

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As to the other statements, they hardly make sense to me, and seem rather irrelevant from what little I can gleam of them.

They do if you accept the first statement, maybe that's why.

fishpasta

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Originally Posted by clickjaw

Enlighten me.

So searle says that mental representations are physical properties, and they are holistic, so they can only be instantiated in a neural network. Other physicalisms, like fodor's psychofunctionalism, take mental representations to be functional states, but take them to be modular, so that holism is not required. Both of these views seem to have no problem accounting for the intrinsically intentional character of mental states.

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They do if you accept the first statement, maybe that's why.

I'm not sure what an explanation (a type of proposition) being designed means. Nor am I sure why its being an illusion would entail that physicalism is "incoherent".

clickjaw

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Originally Posted by fishpasta

So searle says that mental representations are physical properties, and they are holistic, so they can only be instantiated in a neural network.

If I remember correctly Searle says intentions stem from physical response to external stimuli, but the intentions are only functional linguistically with mental representations. We more or less assign intention to things for the sake of communicating, much different then stating intentionality relates to anything beyond ourselves.

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Other physicalisms, like fodor's psychofunctionalism, take mental representations to be functional states, but take them to be modular, so that holism is not required. Both of these views seem to have no problem accounting for the intrinsically intentional character of mental states.

Are the causes in my brain still blind and impersonal?

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I'm not sure what an explanation (a type of proposition) being designed means. Nor am I sure why its being an illusion would entail that physicalism is "incoherent".

Dennett says we adopt the "design stance" when trying to explain the workings of nature. Not that anything is actually designed, but that it's easier for us to explain/understand it as if it were designed. In this way our thoughts about things are used to design things, and the design itself was done intentionally. If intentionality isn't real, then neither is the design stance or anything that follows.

The position of intentionality as illusion (and yes, there are physicalists who believe this), in essence, undercuts explanation itself.

fishpasta

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Originally Posted by clickjaw

If I remember correctly Searle says intentions stem from physical response to external stimuli, but the intentions are only functional linguistically with mental representations. We more or less assign intention to things for the sake of communicating, much different then stating intentionality relates to anything beyond ourselves.

So, intentionality, e.g. the intentionality of the belief that you just posted that, is for searle a constitutive aspect of the belief. If the belief failed to be about your post, it would not be a belief that you just posted that. It would be something else. The belief itself is constituted by physical properties. So the intentionality of the belief comes from the fact that there is a real thing (your post) that it is referring to, or rather, that you are referring to.

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Are the causes in my brain still blind and impersonal?

I am not entirely sure I'm understanding you right, but they certainly aren't blind (in the sense that they are non-random), and they certainly aren't impersonal (in the sense that they go on in a person).

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Dennett says we adopt the "design stance" when trying to explain the workings of nature. Not that anything is actually designed, but that it's easier for us to explain/understand it as if it were designed. In this way our thoughts about things are used to design things, and the design itself was done intentionally. If intentionality isn't real, then neither is the design stance or anything that follows.

So, I'm not sure what the function of using such a complicated concept is. For instance, if understanding is possible at all, then intentionality must exist, because understanding is understanding of something. OF course this is only observer relative, not intrinsic intentionality, so minds aren't necessary for understanding (which is why you can have accounts of understanding that eliminate the notion of mental content. These are called anti-realist accounts of understanding, or more generally, mind). Most people think that understanding is constitutively realist, such that anti-realists who believe in it are confused about what it means. In that case, intrinsic intentionality is required for understanding, and hence mental content is required.

So what you can do here is just say "look, the physicalists want to say they understand the mind, but their view implies intentionality doesn't exist, ergo they can't possibly understand the mind if their view is correct".

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The position of intentionality as illusion (and yes, there are physicalists who believe this), in essence, undercuts explanation itself.

Well, no. It undercuts understanding (explanation is just propositional, it doesn't require people). At least if you are a realist about understanding.

In any case, it seems clear that you can get intentionality to exist on Searle's view, as well as on Fodor's, or any physicalist's (except those who explicitly deny it and have no use for it).

clickjaw

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Originally Posted by fishpasta

So, intentionality, e.g. the intentionality of the belief that you just posted that, is for searle a constitutive aspect of the belief. If the belief failed to be about your post, it would not be a belief that you just posted that. It would be something else. The belief itself is constituted by physical properties. So the intentionality of the belief comes from the fact that there is a real thing (your post) that it is referring to, or rather, that you are referring to.

So, would you say that the belief regarding intentional states is a fact about the brain and nothing else?

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I am not entirely sure I'm understanding you right, but they certainly aren't blind (in the sense that they are non-random), and they certainly aren't impersonal (in the sense that they go on in a person).

Intentionality is goal directed and only derivative of some kind of agent. Physicalism works under the presumption that the causes of anything are undirected and derivative of whatever the first cause diachronically may be (which is certainly not a agent, since that is ruled out a priori). However, physicalists can only come to this conclusion under the presumption that rational explanations exist and can be formed with intentionality. So, I guess my question is: where does intentionality come from in a strictly physical world? If intentionality doesn't exist, then physicalism and any explanations rendered by it seem rather trivial.

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So, I'm not sure what the function of using such a complicated concept is. For instance, if understanding is possible at all, then intentionality must exist, because understanding is understanding of something. OF course this is only observer relative, not intrinsic intentionality, so minds aren't necessary for understanding (which is why you can have accounts of understanding that eliminate the notion of mental content. These are called anti-realist accounts of understanding, or more generally, mind). Most people think that understanding is constitutively realist, such that anti-realists who believe in it are confused about what it means. In that case, intrinsic intentionality is required for understanding, and hence mental content is required.

So what you can do here is just say "look, the physicalists want to say they understand the mind, but their view implies intentionality doesn't exist, ergo they can't possibly understand the mind if their view is correct".

This is kind of close to what my OP states.

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Well, no. It undercuts understanding (explanation is just propositional, it doesn't require people). At least if you are a realist about understanding.

In any case, it seems clear that you can get intentionality to exist on Searle's view, as well as on Fodor's, or any physicalist's (except those who explicitly deny it and have no use for it).

First, how does explanation not require people? Second, Searle and Fodor adopt an "intentional stance" in an attempt to explain a fact about the intentional workings of the mind. In other words to explain intentionality, they must use intentionality. Where does this prior intentionality come from?

fishpasta

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Originally Posted by clickjaw

So, would you say that the belief regarding intentional states is a fact about the brain and nothing else?

Well the belief isn't itself a fact. It's a fact that "john has the belief that intentional states are physical properties of the mind", if that's what you mean. The beliefs in this case are properties of the brain.

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Intentionality is goal directed and only derivative of some kind of agent. Physicalism works under the presumption that the causes of anything are undirected and derivative of whatever the first cause diachronically may be (which is certainly not a agent, since that is ruled out a priori). However, physicalists can only come to this conclusion under the presumption that rational explanations exist and can be formed with intentionality. So, I guess my question is: where does intentionality come from in a strictly physical world? If intentionality doesn't exist, then physicalism and any explanations rendered by it seem rather trivial.

So, observer relative intentionality comes from the content of various propositions. E.g. the intentionality of the sentence "there is pie over there" comes from the semantic content of the sentence (the content is what the sentence is about). The intentionality of intentional states is intrinsic intentionality, and that comes from the satisfaction conditions of the intentional state. For instance, the satisfaction condition for "the belief that mary has pie" is the state of affairs such that mary has pie being true. The subject of that sentence, that is, what the sentence is about, is the state of affairs where mary has pie.

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This is kind of close to what my OP states.

Fair enough, then that is a legitimate worry.

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First, how does explanation not require people? Second, Searle and Fodor adopt an "intentional stance" in an attempt to explain a fact about the intentional workings of the mind. In other words to explain intentionality, they must use intentionality. Where does this prior intentionality come from?

Explanation doesn't require people because it just involves observer-relative intentionality and non-mental content. For instance, the explanation of a rock falling from a hill might be that a dog hit it. The fact that the dog hit it is the explanatory content. This doesn't have anything to do with persons.

I don't see how they are making use of a "prior intentionality" to explain how intentional states work. "intrinstic intentionality" is the interesting property of mental representations that makes them actually represent things in the world. It's the property they have of being about certain things. The way it works is by virtue of things called "satisfaction conditions". Different representations have different satisfaction conditions, and hence are about different things (the things specified in the satisfaction conditions, e.g. their content). This explanation of intentional content doesn't rely on intentionality.

clickjaw

I now see were I may have gone wrong in my OP, in that it should have perhaps been addressed to physicalists of the eliminative materialist persuasion.

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Originally Posted by fishpasta

Well the belief isn't itself a fact. It's a fact that "john has the belief that intentional states are physical properties of the mind", if that's what you mean. The beliefs in this case are properties of the brain.

I agree, it is a fact about a typically functioning mind, and beliefs are not facts in themselves. Beliefs are about facts.

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So, observer relative intentionality comes from the content of various propositions. E.g. the intentionality of the sentence "there is pie over there" comes from the semantic content of the sentence (the content is what the sentence is about). The intentionality of intentional states is intrinsic intentionality, and that comes from the satisfaction conditions of the intentional state. For instance, the satisfaction condition for "the belief that mary has pie" is the state of affairs such that mary has pie being true. The subject of that sentence, that is, what the sentence is about, is the state of affairs where mary has pie.

I agree that in language there has to be an innate intentionality, or that intentionality is needed to help explain and make sense of what our thoughts are about.

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Explanation doesn't require people because it just involves observer-relative intentionality and non-mental content. For instance, the explanation of a rock falling from a hill might be that a dog hit it. The fact that the dog hit it is the explanatory content. This doesn't have anything to do with persons.

I don't see how they are making use of a "prior intentionality" to explain how intentional states work. "intrinstic intentionality" is the interesting property of mental representations that makes them actually represent things in the world. It's the property they have of being about certain things. The way it works is by virtue of things called "satisfaction conditions". Different representations have different satisfaction conditions, and hence are about different things (the things specified in the satisfaction conditions, e.g. their content). This explanation of intentional content doesn't rely on intentionality.

Let's say there is a computer that is programmed to observe a video of a hand letting go of a ping-pong ball which then drops into a glass of water. The computer is able to analyze all the objects in the video (shape, color, form, size, etc.), it is able to associate the objects in the video with pre-loaded images, it is able to associate the motion of the ball is going downward and stopping at the waters surface with a pre-loaded image of an object dropping. Let's say that there is an alternate program which translates these images into predetermined phrases, set in a proper sequence of events, and which also translates those phrases and sequence into intelligible sentences, such that the sentence it renders is: What was just observed was a hand letting go of a ball which then drops into a glass of water. In addition, the computer has another program which tests its statement against the rules of logic and natural laws as preconditions to approximate a probable accuracy for the statement in order to make a determination that what it sees, is veridical.

I can do a similar act of rationalizing physical events in approximately the same way. Here is the difference: the computer is designed with a purpose of ascertaining truth (all of its intentionality is derivative of a prior intentionality, namely the creator's intentionality); I, however, (at least according to strict physicalists) have an intentional capacity due to unintentional causes. So, we can only understand/explain intentionality in terms of agentive causes, because our first-hand experience is such that I see the problem of intentionality in a strictly physical universe and only I can set in motion the act of analyzing it. But in a strictly physical universe there is no I initiating anything. I just want to know how my intentionality is formed by unguided causes, because it is impossible for me to be detached enough from my bias' of intentionality and self-hood to ultimately determine that I have no intentions.

In other words, if intentionality is an illusion, and there is no I in any real sense (only in an epiphenominal sense) from which intentionality can be derived, who is it that is being deceived? (I know this question is kind of going in a different direction than the OP, forgive me.)

(This one is more in line with the OP.) Also, what in nature can account for intentionality and its propensity for veridical accuracy?

fishpasta

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Originally Posted by clickjaw

I now see were I may have gone wrong in my OP, in that it should have perhaps been addressed to physicalists of the eliminative materialist persuasion.

I agree, it is a fact about a typically functioning mind, and beliefs are not facts in themselves. Beliefs are about facts.

I agree that in language there has to be an innate intentionality, or that intentionality is needed to help explain and make sense of what our thoughts are about.

Let's say there is a computer that is programmed to observe a video of a hand letting go of a ping-pong ball which then drops into a glass of water. The computer is able to analyze all the objects in the video (shape, color, form, size, etc.), it is able to associate the objects in the video with pre-loaded images, it is able to associate the motion of the ball is going downward and stopping at the waters surface with a pre-loaded image of an object dropping. Let's say that there is an alternate program which translates these images into predetermined phrases, set in a proper sequence of events, and which also translates those phrases and sequence into intelligible sentences, such that the sentence it renders is: What was just observed was a hand letting go of a ball which then drops into a glass of water. In addition, the computer has another program which tests its statement against the rules of logic and natural laws as preconditions to approximate a probable accuracy for the statement in order to make a determination that what it sees, is veridical.

I can do a similar act of rationalizing physical events in approximately the same way. Here is the difference: the computer is designed with a purpose of ascertaining truth (all of its intentionality is derivative of a prior intentionality, namely the creator's intentionality); I, however, (at least according to strict physicalists) have an intentional capacity due to unintentional causes. So, we can only understand/explain intentionality in terms of agentive causes, because our first-hand experience is such that I see the problem of intentionality in a strictly physical universe and only I can set in motion the act of analyzing it. But in a strictly physical universe there is no I initiating anything. I just want to know how my intentionality is formed by unguided causes, because it is impossible for me to be detached enough from my bias' of intentionality and self-hood to ultimately determine that I have no intentions.

So I think you're confusing "intentionality", which is the aboutness of a sentence or representation, and the intentionality which has to do with an agent's intentions, e.g. purposes desires etc. These are two different things. If your point is about the second kind, you should perhaps use the phrase "teleology", to make clear you're talking about purpose and design and so on, as those subjects have nothing to do with intentionality proper (although they do involve intentional states, just like say, the belief that pigs fly involves an intentional state. Pigs flying, however, doesn't have to do with intentionality).

So, shifting the topic of the thread to teleology, we can move on to your next point.

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In other words, if intentionality is an illusion, and there is no I in any real sense (only in an epiphenominal sense) from which intentionality can be derived, who is it that is being deceived? (I know this question is kind of going in a different direction than the OP, forgive me.)

Well, if free will doesn't exist, and there is no self, then there is no one being deceived. So, for instance, the theists and the atheists which don't believe in selves, would think its a confused to utter "I am being deceived". Alternately they could think it can be analyzed as "the locus of properties generally over here is being deceived".

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(This one is more in line with the OP.) Also, what in nature can account for intentionality and its propensity for veridical accuracy?

I think you're shifting back to the philosophical term "intentionality" here. In which case perhaps you can just say "what in nature can account for the verdical accuracy of beliefs?". For that subject, I'd suggest you look up Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism, and the responses to it.

clickjaw

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Originally Posted by fishpasta

So I think you're confusing "intentionality", which is the aboutness of a sentence or representation, and the intentionality which has to do with an agent's intentions, e.g. purposes desires etc. These are two different things. If your point is about the second kind, you should perhaps use the phrase "teleology", to make clear you're talking about purpose and design and so on, as those subjects have nothing to do with intentionality proper (although they do involve intentional states, just like say, the belief that pigs fly involves an intentional state. Pigs flying, however, doesn't have to do with intentionality).

Thank you, I'm equivocating. That was the whole point of this. For the last three years I've been studying the philosophy of mind because I believe it to be the key to everything. I am self-taught on this subject and trying to refine my positions a bit.

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Well, if free will doesn't exist, and there is no self, then there is no one being deceived. So, for instance, the theists and the atheists which don't believe in selves, would think its a confused to utter "I am being deceived". Alternately they could think it can be analyzed as "the locus of properties generally over here is being deceived".

Fair enough from physicalist axioms.

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I think you're shifting back to the philosophical term "intentionality" here. In which case perhaps you can just say "what in nature can account for the verdical accuracy of beliefs?". For that subject, I'd suggest you look up Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism, and the responses to it.

Fair enough, equivocation again. Also, I'm very familiar with Plantinga's EAAN, but thanks for the suggestion.